

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6

BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

RECORD
COPY

NUMBER 52

DATE: 7 November 1960

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 308. Sino-Soviet Tensions: Reconciliation Rally
in Moscow?
- 309. The Algerian Problem and the UN
- 310. Castro Tightens Totalitarian Controls
in Cuba
- 311. Contingency Guidance on Unification of
Central Asian Soviet Republics
- 312. Chinese Communist Penetration of Africa
- 313. Chicom Use of Food Imports and Foreign
Exchange for Political Purposes

25X1C

Approved For

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

7 November

308. Sino-Soviet Tensions: Reconciliation Rally in Moscow?

Leaders of many, if not all, Communist Parties are convening in Moscow in a further effort to settle the continuing differences between the CPSU and the CCP. Information on the particulars of this meeting has been scanty thus far; it is obviously related to the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (7 November); it (or subsequent meetings) may also have significance in connection with the next plenum of the Central Committee, CPSU, which, according to an unconfirmed report, is to meet on or about 16 November; another event to which the meeting (s) may well relate will be the 22nd CPSU Congress expected to take place in December or January (see Guidance #298, 10 October 1960). It is not presently clear whether this meeting represents essentially the "reconciliation commission", reportedly appointed at the Bucharest Conference of last June, or whether it may take the form of a "summit Meeting" of all Communist top leaders, comparable to their rally in 1957 at the 40th anniversary of the Revolution. It may, of course be neither. Liu Shao Chi, Chairman of the Peoples Republic of China is present with a delegation rather than Mao himself.

Several recent incidents indicate that the Communist leaders have difficulties with their time tables: Khrushchev did not visit North Korea early in October, nor did he visit Cuba after his attendance of the UNGA, the East German Communist Party has postponed its Congress, and so forth. Nevertheless, further development in the relations between Moscow and Peiping should be watched attentively. The significance of these cancellations may become clear during the November meeting.

25X1C10b

Guidance



~~SECRET~~

25X1C10b


Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6

7 November 1960

309. The Algerian Problem and the UN

Riots in Paris, persistent rumors of behind-the-scenes manoeuvring amongst dissident political and military groups in France, Khrushchev's apparent de facto recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government (PAG) and Ferhat Abbas' announcement in Rome that he will receive arms from the USSR and Communist China all highlight the grave dilemma that now confronts President de Gaulle and the extreme sensitiveness of the situation at the UN as it approaches consideration of the Algerian problem again. French leaders have urged the US and, presumably, other Western countries not to take a position on the Algerian question that would give further encouragement to untra-nationalist groups in France and make further negotiations more difficult. In Africa, in the Near East and in Asia, the demand for Algerian independence grows steadily stronger. Quite recently, President Bourguiba of Tunisia has suggested that there be a "fusion" of the PAG with his country. Morocco displays increasing concern over France's failure to find a peaceful solution. And Moscow and Peking continue to exacerbate the situation by openly supporting the cause of the Algerians. 25X1C10b



~~SECRET~~

November 1960


310. ~~Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6~~

In mid-October Fidel Castro began a propaganda campaign charging that the United States threatened Cuba with invasion. The campaign was obviously designed for impact on the international scene but seems possibly to cloak a series of measures which he is taking to tighten already considerable totalitarian controls on the country. He announced at the outset of the campaign that he expected every member of his militia to act as an informant and report immediately any indications of anti-regime activity. Reports from Havana indicate that the militia, which the government boasts numbers over 200,000, has taken over the actual duties of the regular police force: the latter now being restricted to the house-keeping role of merely running the police stations. La Revolution, official newspaper of the regime, has been printing evidence that the informer system is now functioning on a regular basis. Stories of children informing on their parents are increasing. The militia apparently is being organized into a Cuban version of the Fascist and Communist bloc warden system. On 30 October an announcement was made that Havana was being divided into forty-three districts. One hundred and forty-seven militia members are to be assigned to be in charge of each district and specific arms and ammunition centers established in each of these zones. Also on 30 October, thought control was increased in the mass communications media field, which has been completely under government control for many months. The 30 October announcement was that the last remaining entertainment feature would be banned from television; henceforth all television programs will be strictly government propaganda. Meanwhile, restrictions on movement and travel are being increased. For some time attempts to limit travel have been in effect. Plans to nationalize travel agencies and ticket agents have been announced. Recently a special list of bankers, heads of nationalized businesses and other key figures in the economic field who will not be permitted to leave the country has been circulated. The list includes Nunez Jimenez, chief of Castro's all-powerful National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), who regards himself as a Cuban version of a Russian commissar.

The classic Communist pattern of takeover in Eastern Europe involved among other things: 1) Infiltration of Communists and fellow-travelers into key positions in the government and the economy, 2) Elimination of the upper and middle classes through (a) redistribution of the land, (b) redistribution of housing, and (c) nationalization of industry, banking, and commerce. A similar process has already progressed to a high degree in Cuba. The Cubans have also adopted from the Chinese Communists an additional important technique of control, i. e., the establishment of an armed people's militia on a wide scale, which has in effect replaced the Cuban army. These controls are fast being imposed largely along traditional Communist lines, even if the facade of a non-Communist revolution is being preserved.

25X1C10b

Guidance



25X1C10b

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6

SECRET November 1960

311. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6

A report from an official West German intelligence service states that, on 16 November 1960, the CPSU Central Committee will hold a plenary meeting, at which a special commission will present a plan for the union of the Uzbek, Tadzhik, Kazakh, and Kirghiz SSR's in a Central Asian SSR, "in keeping with a long-standing wish of Khrushchev."

Assuming that this unification takes place, it will represent more than the satisfaction of an old whim. The Kazakh SSR, whose population roughly equals all the others put together, has long been a trouble-spot. On the agricultural side, Kazakhstan is a principal theater for the "New Lands" program, which has been pushed by Khrushchev himself. This program, involving the cultivation of marginal soils in an area subject to drought and early frost, is believed by experts to be unworkable in the long run. In practice, 1956 and 1958 were bumper years, but in 1955 and 1957 most of the "New Lands" suffered drought; in 1955, the yield was 30% below average. In 1959 four million acres of grain were not harvested before the frost, and latest indications are that there will be even more loss from this cause this year. Developments in the "New Lands" have been reflected in the career of Nikolay Ilich Belyayev; an agricultural expert, he had a meteoric rise to a position on the CPSU Presidium. Then, for unknown reasons, he was sent out to Kazakhstan to head the party; apparently he was being given a chance to redeem himself by making a success of the Kazakh "New Lands". In January 1960, Khrushchev downgraded him to purely local office as a result of the 1959 harvest losses, and he has recently disappeared completely from public notice. There has been trouble in Kazakh industry, too, and in October 1959 there were strikes, due to unbearable living conditions, in Karaganda Oblast; these workers' protests were followed by police repression (an eyewitness estimated that 100 rioters were killed and a thousand wounded) and firings of officials. Since the hunting of scapegoats has not improved the Kazakh economy, Khrushchev is now apparently seeking to meet the situation and to control it by completely reorganizing Central Asian administration. But he can hardly abandon the impractical "New Lands" program, as this would mean too great a loss of prestige for him.

Aside from the economic problem, there are other factors which may have a bearing on the proposed unification. One of these is the persistence of the Moslem faith in this area. Another is the danger of pan-Turk sentiment in the population, probably intensified by the new Slavic settlers. There is now a Slavic majority (70%) in Kazakhstan, due to immigration, and unification will tend to blot out the native cultures in the whole area. Probably more important is the proximity of the Kazakh, Tadzhik, and Kirghiz Republics to Sinkiang Province in Communist China. Before 1949, Sinkiang was subject to Soviet penetration. Now the threat may be moving in the opposite direction. Some pre-1955 Chinese maps assign the Pamir salient of the Tadzhik SSR to China; other, more recent maps indicate that the Sino-Soviet border in this area is not officially settled.

Photographs in the 1 May 1960 issue of the Chieh-fang-chun Hua-pao, a Chinese Communist illustrated magazine, showed Chinese troops training and quartering on the Pamir border. The leaders in the Kremlin may fear that the Chinese will start moving in, as they did in Northern India, and that the small Tadzhik and Kirghiz Republics will be the object of Chinese Communist "salami tactics" unless they are merged into another, larger unit. It is interesting to note that the German report makes no mention of the inclusion of the Turkmen Republic, which lies at a great distance from the Chinese frontier.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6

7 November 1960

312. Chinese Communist Penetration of Africa

The Chinese Communists -- during this year in which so many African states have achieved independence -- have been making especially strong efforts towards penetration of that continent which they began immediately following the Bandung Conference of 1955. Chicom activity already includes an ambitious spread of broadcasts to Africa, with programs in French, English, Arabic, and Portuguese; Cantonese language broadcasts are also directed toward Chinese minorities in South Africa, Mauritius (where Chinese number some 16,000), and the Malagasy Republic. New China News Agency offices have been established in Ghana and Morocco, and an additional one is planned for Guinea. Chinese publications in substantial numbers are reportedly on the market in Zanzibar, and the number of these is said to be growing in both Guinea and Senegal. A Chinese-African People's Friendship Association was formed in April 1960, and "people's diplomacy" is extensively employed. Dance and opera troupes try to arouse popular interest in China, and, this year, a group of Chinese acrobats concluded an extensive tour of Africa with calls in Sudan, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Guinea.

The Chicom representative on the Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, however, has found himself somewhat frustrated because of the influence of the UAR, which has its own designs on the new African states. The Chicoms have not only to combat Chinese Nationalist influence (which is not negligible), but find themselves also at odds with the USSR, which disagrees with Peiping over methods of exploiting the African situation. These differences with the USSR arose over the fact that the Soviets consider most African countries not yet ripe for revolutionary action, Communist style, and are willing to offer aid to what Peiping terms their "bourgeois governments", while Peiping wants to support revolutionary action and is more willing than Moscow to accept the risk that such action might develop into major war. Moreover, so far, only six African states (Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali) have recognized Peiping. However, it is likely that several of the new states will try to recognize both Peiping and Taipei. The rebel Algerian government has already been recognized by the Chinese Reds, and the Algerian rebels have agreed to set up a diplomatic post in Peiping. Efforts have been made to expand Africa's trade with China, although the potential is limited by the distances involved and China's inability to provide large quantities of much-wanted industrial goods. A trade pact has been signed with Morocco and, during his recent visit to Peiping, President Sekou Toure of Guinea received a \$25,000,000 interest-free credit.

Guidance

25X1C10b

~~SECRET~~

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6

~~SECRET~~ 7 November 1960

313. Chicom Use of Food Imports and Foreign Exchange for Political Purposes

Prolonged droughts, combined with serious floods and self-defeating agricultural policies, have led to a near famine situation in certain areas of Communist China. This has obliged the Chinese to suspend rice deliveries to bloc countries, has seriously hampered the Chinese industrial program and could subsequently have a marked effect on the standard of living throughout the country.

An intelligence report indicates that a Chinese Economic Mission has purchased 4,200 tons of rice from Cambodia and is attempting to purchase an additional 7,000 tons. The Chinese press has reported that China will import 400,000 tons of rice from Burma in 1961 as a result of the settlement of the Sino-Burmese border dispute. We believe that most of this high quality rice will, in all probability, be exported in order to fulfill China's commitments as a result of trade agreements with Cuba and Ceylon.

The Albanian radio reported on 10 October that a large shipment of wheat had been received from the Chinese People's Republic. Albania, which is not agriculturally self-sufficient, has been relying almost entirely on the Soviets to fill its needs. It is probable that, as a result of the growing political rift between Albania and the USSR, the latter has cut off its shipments and the Chinese are attempting to fill the gap.

25X1C10b

Guidance



~~SECRET~~

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6